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ABSTRA
This study describes how accelerating inflation has led households in
different economic and demographic classes to reallocate their "transactable
savings." Cross—section data from the 1962 and 1970 Surveys of Consumer
Finances are used to estimate both the composition of accumulated household
saving and prospective rates of return on this saving.
The paper shows that accelerating inflation has, in thee presence of com-
prehensive ceilings on deposit interest rates, altered the savings incentives
of different types of households. The effect has been to bias small savers
toward leveraged investments in tangible assets (especially real estate) and
large savers toward certificates of deposit and marketable bonds. Small savers
with disadvantaged access to credit are simply victimized.
Our analysis helps to explain a number of anomalous features of the 1975—
1979 macroeconomic recovery, particularly the dominant role of consumer spending,
the unprecedented expansion of household debt, the boom in housing, and de-
clining flows of household savings into deposit institutitons.
These data underscore the unintended consequences of trying to reconcile
deposit-rate. ceilings with accelerating inflation. This combination of policies
unpleasantly distorts the sectoral composition of spending and risk—bearing
(crowding out some productive business investment) and aggrevates inequities
in the distribution of income and opportunity.
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ACCELERATING INFLATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION
OF HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS INCENTIVES*
Edward J. Kane
Political rhetoric characterizes inflation as a high-ranking public enemy
that society must band together to fight. But this view is exaggerated. Real-world
inflation isneveruniform in its effects. While some prices shoot up rapidly, other
prices move hardly at all, and a few even decline. Uneven movements in prices
cause inflation to affect the economic welfare of different people differently.
The distribution of costs and benefits across the population works through the
distribution of assets, debts, and labor skills. Just as some homes are protected
against floods or earthquakes, some households possess skills and balance sheets
whose net market values are protected against inflation.
Even when society as a whole is doing little to stop inflation, a venturesome
household can neutralize inflation by suitably reallocating its wealth. It can do so
by shifting its wealth (as far as transactions costs permit) into a collection of
assets and liabilities whose overall rate of return promises to improve with
anticipated and unanticipated increases in inflation. But most portfolios that
protect against unanticipated inflation are speculative, in that they threaten to
develop substantial losses if unanticipated deflation should ensue instead.
This study describes how, in the middle and late 1960s, households in
different economic and demographic classes reallocated their "transactable say-
ings" to cope with accelerating inflation. We define transactable savings to mean2
essentially noncontractual savings:savings that are not administered for
households by insurance companies, pension funds, or the U.S. SocialSecurity
System.
We use cross-section data from the 1962 and 1970 Surveys of Consumer
Finances to estimate both the composition of household portfolios of transactable
savings and prospective rates of return on these portfolios. Our purpose is to cast
some light on how accelerating inflation affects the savings incentives of different
households and to map out resulting differences in the distribution of opportunities
for accumulating personal wealth.
Our data set neglects claims on pension funds and wealth accumulated in
collectibles, food inventories, and consumer durables that are not built into homes.
Aggregate Flow of Funds data for the household sector developed by Cagan and
Lipsey (1978) suggest that these unmeasured asset categories captured about half
of the flow of net household saving between 1962 and 1970.1 This proportionmay
be somewhat higher for younger and less-wealthy households.
As Cagan and Lipsey (1978) have shown, Flow of Funds data covering the
household sector as a whole show virtually no change in balance-sheet ratios
between 1962 and 1970. Moreover, although households' aggregate ratio of tangible
to intangible assets rises sharply after 1972, Cagan and Lipsey argue that the
increase can be attributed to capital appreciation on a relatively unchanging
collection of assets, with no need to presume an active shift into inflation-
protected assets. The research reported here indicates that the apparent passivity
in aggregate household portfolio ratios conceals some important shifts in asset-
holding among wealth and age classes.
In the contemporary United States, the redistributive effects of
accelerating inflation can be properly understood only in conjunction with3
longstanding federal and state policies to promote homeownership and housing
construction whose qualitative effects on savings incentives vary with the rate of
inflation. These policies consist principally of income—tax preferences available to
homeowners and a grab—bag of programs and political forces that act to slow
inflation-induced increases in the nominal rate of interest charged on mortgage
funds.
Our analysis features the concept of regulation-constrained portfolio
balance. We show that, both to hedge inflation risk inherent in their nontran-
sactable savings and to eke out a positive net real after-tax rate of return on their
transactable funds, all but the wealthiest U.S. households found it advantageous to
substitute investments in housing and investment real estate (and presumably also
in collectibles, food inventories, and consumer durables) for traditional financial
vehicles for savings. Influenced by transactions-cost and tax differentials, the
nation's oldest and wealthiest households shifted their transactable wealth dif-
ferently. They moved on balance out of home equity and traditional deposit
accounts into certificates of deposit (CDs), marketable bonds, and equity in
investment real estate.
Although both patterns of portfolio rebalancing make sense ex ante, the
resulting balance sheets are noticeably riskier than the portfolios held by the
corresponding sets of households in 1962. When in the 1970s bond prices declined
and stock values failed to increase with unanticipated inflation, real returns earned
by most wealthy households fared badly ex .Thesedevelopments have left our
nation's wealthiest households anxious and confused, particularly about the ability
of common stocks to act as an inflation hedge. On the other hand, trends in
housing prices have rewarded and reassured those generally less-wealthy investors
who shifted heavily into real estate, especially those who dared to leverage
themselves to the hilt.4
Disaggregating household behavior, particularly by wealthand age, helps to
explain a number of puzzling special features of the 1975-79macroeconomic
recovery. These special features include:the dominant role of consumer spending;
unprecedented increases in household debt; changing patternsof financial inter-
mediaton; the improving quality of owner-occupied housing; and the growing specu-
lative boom in residential real estate. Our analysis portrays eachof these
developments as a reasonable response to changes in the savingsincentives facing
households of different means.
I. HOW ACCELERATING INFLATION HAS HURT THESMALL SAVER
Some Preliminary Definitions.
It is convenient to begin with some definitions. Byt?small savers,'t we mean
households of modest means: families whose accumulatednet transactable wealth
is less that $10,000. Returns on these savings may be expressedin several ways.
Nominal rates of return are ratios of capital income toinvested principal that
make no correction for either anticipated or observed changesin the purchasing
power of the sums to be lent and repaid.So-called market yields are invariably
stated in nominal terms. Real rates of return arenominal rates less the rate of
inflation anticipated or observed over the period duringwhich the financial
contract is held.
Anticipated inflation clearly affects the termsof loan contracts. Lenders
want to negotiate a nominal rate of interest thatexceeds the anticipated rate of
inflation by what they take to be the "realt' opportunitycost of their funds. In
turn, borrowers can afford to paynominal rates of interest that exceed the
antieipated rate of inflation by theamount of the funds' perceived ttrealtt
productivity in the use they are going to serve.Hence, market interest rates tend5
to rise and fall with the level of anticipated inflation (Fisher, 1930). In addition, at
any point in time an asset's nominal yield tends to rise with its subsequent inflation
risk. Other things equal, the less perfectly an asset's nominal yield promises to rise
with unanticipated future increases in inflation, the higher the nominal yield it
must offer today (Fama and Schwert, 1977).
Explicit interest consists of returns to capital (coupon interest plus capital
gains) that are paid, or are at least receivable in, the coin of the realm. Implicit
interest covers services and other in-kind concessions that are often embodied in
debt contracts. An asset's total rate of return is the sum of its explicit and
implicit yields. Finally, an asset's net yield is its total rate of return minus any
transactions costs associated with buying and selling the asset.
How Interest Ceilings hurt Small Savers.
By raising expected rates of future inflation, observed accelerations in
inflation tend to raise market rates of interest, although the response is not
necessarily one—for-one and tends to be spread out in time. In nominal terms,
rising market rates of interest mean improved new loan and investment
opportunities for lenders. When deposit institutions are allowed to compete freely
for deposit funds, pursuing these opportunities bids up deposit interest rates.
On the other hand, when deposit rates are held down by government-imposed
ceilings, small savers cannot directly participate as fully in rising market rates as
large savers can. This is because it is more costly per dollar for small savers to
move their funds into securities markets. For small accumulations of wealth, the
costs in yield equivalent of acquiring marketable securities are substantial. First,
most small savers find it expensive simply to acquire sufficient financial sophisti-
cation to identify and track suitable investment opportunities.Second, the6
structure of dealer and broker transactions charges prevents low—value investments
in open-market instruments from being economical. Third, because marketable
instruments are seldom issued in small denominations, small portfolios of market-
able instruments are almost always imperfectly diversified and subject therefore to
excessive default and interest-rate risk.
In fully competitive markets, retail financial institutions (called financial
intermediaries) develop to overcome these disadvantages by indirectly pooling
household funds into amounts that can be invested economically (Gurley and Shaw,
1960). The pooling is indirect because these firms (commercial banks, thrift
institutions, insurance companies, and mutual funds) sell their own debt to house-
holds and invest the proceeds for their own accounts. Intermediation occurs with
respect both to denomination and to portfolio risk and is typically coupled with
provisions for delivering additional services (e.g., depository institutionsoffer
liquidity and transactions services to their accountholders). To the extent that the
costs of providing nonpecuniary services are not recouped through fee income,
these services may be treated as implicit interest payments. In competitive
deposit markets, arrangements for paying implicit interest could in principlebe
sufficiently flexible to avoid efficiency losses from ceilings on explicit interest
rates. But this condition is unlikely to be met in practice, especially in view of the
asymmetric tax treatment of implicit and explicit interest receipts byU.S.
households. Because households (unlike business firms) cannot deduct service
charges from taxable income, implicit interest is tax—advantaged.
In competitive equilibrium, the value of implicit and explicit interest
payments to intermediary customers must at the margin equalthe risk-adjusted
yield that competing intermediaries expect to earn on marketinstruments after
meeting expenses and paying normal returns on capitaLIf a depository7
intermediary were to pay less interest than this, competitors would bid its
depositors away. If a depository intermediary incurred excessive expenses (perhaps
in the process of subsidizing a disproportionate amount of nonpecuniary services),
either explicit interest or returns on capital would slide below competitive norms.
Either event would cause pressure on the intermediary's management to restore
operating efficiency.
Effective ceilings on deposit interest rates undermine the efficiency of
intermediation. They force depository institutions to compete exclusively in terms
of implicit interest. They are led to expand their packages of subsidized customer
services, often in imaginative ways. Such services include merchandise premiums,
longer operating hours, superfluous branch offices or electronic teller machines,
and "free" checking. Unfortunately, the aggregate value of these services to
individual customers is often far less than their cost to the depository institution.
As individual customers attempt to make the best of what is for many of them a
"bad" bargain, their use of undervalued services wastes economic resources.
Compared to the unregulated case, the efficiency offinancial
intermediation is also reduced by so-called disintermediation, which occurs when
developing interest—rate differentials drive depositors to unregulated institutions
and instruments. Whenever inflation drives open-market yields above the ceiling
rates on deposits, higher—cost unregulated institutions (such as money-market
mutual funds and credit unions) and unregulated instruments (such as repurchase
agreements) are able to expand at the expense of traditional arrangements for
intermediating household savings.8
Effect of Accelerating Inflation on Financial Incentives Facing Small Savers.
Financial theory holds that wealthowners' demand for any asset varies
directly with the net after—tax real rate of return it offers relative to returns
available on other assets. It is also supposed that the level of household saving
increases with the net after-tax real rate available on traditional savings vehicles,
although the evidence for this is far from conclusive (Boskin, 1978; Wachtel, 1977;
Howrey and Hymans, 1978). During the last 15 years, unfavorable movementshave
occurred in marginal tax rates (which were only partly offset by increases in the
standard deduction), in already—discriminatory dealer and broker transactions
charges, and in the real (i.e., inflation—adjusted) values of interest-rate ceilings.
Taken together, these changes have made it unrealistic for small savers to
anticipate earning a positive net real rate of return on any collectionof strictly
financial assets. While financial instruments continue to offer implicit returns in
the form of transactions, liquidity and diversification services, household savings
invested in the types of financial assets available to nonwealthy households have
shown reduced after-tax purchasing power with virtually every passing year.
To counterbalance the negative real after—tax rates of explicit return
offered them by financial assets (and the roughly zero real returns accumulating on
their nontransactable wealth), small savers have increased the weight of favorably
taxed and inflation-protected real assets in their portfolios. To carry this off, they
have had -asour survey data show -tosupplement their accumulated savings with
mortgage and instalment debt and to redirect their current savingsinto down-
payments and debt service. Ironically, usury ceilingsenacted in many states to
improve small savers' access to credit probably interferedwith this process.
Theoretical and empirical analysis (Nathan, 1978) suggests thatfamilies who
receive credit when usury ceilings are erfective generally have above—average9
incomes and wealth. This occurs not just because such individuals are perceived as
more creditworthy, though perceived creditworthiness may seem to dominate
rejections of loan applications from members of minority groups (Sowell, 1975).
What is often more important is that economically advantaged households can more
easily increase deposit balances or meet increases in such up—front costs as higher
downpayments or loan closing fees when lenders choose to exact implicit interest
in such ways.
Unfavorable Movements in Marginal Tax Rates. Because progressive income taxes
are levied on nominal incomes, accelerating inflation increases the effective tax
rate that applies to every level of real income. However, legislated changes in the
applicable tax structure provide some offset. As Table 2 shows, effective marginal
tax rates were raised only for middle-income households. For example, using the
implicit price deflator for GNP a taxable 1970 income of $30,000 corresponds to
$23,173 in 1962 dollars. Using the tax schedule for joint returns with the same real
(i.e., inflation—adjusted) taxable income at both dates, a taxpayer's marginal
federal tax rate would be 40 percent in 1970, but only 38 percent in 1962. On
balance, this taxpayer's average federal tax rate decreased from 28 percent in 1962
to 27 percent in 1970. Because ordinary income tax rates apply to all nominal
interest received, for middle-income households these changes increased the
attractiveness of assets that yield either in-kind services that are not taxed at all
or capital gains that are taxed preferentially.
In addition, the real value of dependent and standard deductions declined
and, in many states, increases in state income taxes observed between survey dates
further enlarged the wedge between before-tax and after-tax rates of return on
nominal interest.10
Unfavorable Movements in Transactions Costs in Securities Markets. In the face of
comprehensive interest-rate ceilings on traditional household savings instruments,
secularly and cyclically accelerating inflation causes disintermediation of house-
hold funds into potentially riskier high—yielding open-market instruments. Disinter—
mediation implies a larger flow of small-denomination trades offered to securities
dealers and brokers. During the late 1960s, the first waves of inflation-induced
disintermediation created clearings logjams in the backrooms of securities firms.
To reduce the volume of individual trades to be processed, securities firms repriced
their services in ways designed to discourage small individual trades.They
instituted posted "ticket fees" on transactions of less than $100,000. The practice
of imposing a charge of $10 to $20 merely for writing up a small purchase or sale
transaction spread through the industry. For many types of trades, securities firms
also raised value—based odd-lot fees, transactions minima, and execution lags.
Even though computerization of transactions and partial deregulation of the
securities industry have lowered costs for large transactors, ticket fees on small
trades have risen. Currently, they range betweeen $25 and $40 per trade.
Discriminatory Adjustments in Deposit-Rate Ceilings. The larger is a household's
wealth, the more alternative financial investment outlets it can economically
consider. Larger savers can reallocate their portfolios to escape much of the ex
ante burden that inflation and deposit-rate regulation would otherwise place on
them. In contrast, poor households' principal avenue of adjustment is to cut back
on their savings, a response that spreads the burden onto their future standard of
living.
Larger savers' differential ability to escape deposit—rate ceilings explains
why regulators have over time adapted the ceilings to permit deposit institutions to11
offer differentially higher interest rates to larger savers who can not be put off by
high minimum denominations or punitive penalties for early withdrawal of time-
deposit funds.Restrictions on minimum denomination and early-withdrawal
penalties have been the cutting edge of a regulatory strategy of enabling deposit
institutions to pay near—market interest rates to interest-sensitive depositors
without raising yields offered to interest-insensitive customers.
II. BEHAVIOR OF INFLATION AND INTEREST RATES DURING THE 1960s
Table 1 shows that long-term interest rates rose throughout the 1960s, with
the rate of increase accelerating sharply (along with the rate of inflation) in the
last half of the decade. For calendar-year holding periods, the last two columns
report ex 2returnson bonds and stock. From year to year, these ex 22 returns
vary sharply.
Let us interpret the twin 1966 shocks of accelerating inflation and
comprehensive deposit-rate ceilings as a joint experimental "treatment" and
inquire how the treatment affected interest-rate spreads. Until 1966 when federal
deposit-rate ceilings were first extended to savings accounts at savings-and-loan
associations (S&Ls) and mutual savings banks (MSBs), mean S&L deposit rates
tended to fluctuate above the average level of yields on Treasury bills, roughly
tracking the average yield on long-term Treasuries.
Subsequently, Treasury yields averaged steadily higher than S&L deposit
rates. Whether this benefited mortgage borrowers is debatable, since even in the
face of deposit-rate ceilings, mortgage rates regularly exceeded yields on long-
term Treasuries, with the spread fluctuating within the same bounds that applied in
the early 1960s.
From 1966 forward, high interest rates on new mortgages offered unusually
good earnings spreads for mortgage lenders. However, federal officials feared that12
open competition for savings funds would bankruptolder S&Ls and MSBs that had
to carry lots of low-rate mortgages on their books. With free competition, higher
deposit rates would have to be paid on all accounts, while competitive mortgage
rates could be earned 2! on current loans.Institutions holding substantial
proportions of older low—rate mortgages would experience negativeoverall cash
flows. Alternatively, one could say that higher current interest rates reducedthe
market value of many thrifts' seasoned long-term assets enough to exhausttheir
previously accumulated net worth. Restrictions on S&L andMSB deposit interest
were introduced to prevent newer firms from ruining theolder ones. To keep
commercial banks at a disadvantage, ceilings for thrifts were initially set 50basis
points above those that applied to commercial banks. (This"differential" has since
narrowed to 25 basis points.) Federal authorities conceived the systemof ceilings
as a temporary stopgap measure, intended to avert animmediate threat of
financial panic and to avoid temporarily destablizing the flow of mortgagecredit
and homebuilding activity. They sought to assure specializedmortgage-lending
institutions a positive net cash flow by locking in an above—market profit margin on
new lending to offset the slim (or negative) spread onold lending, presumably only
until interest rates turned down again cyclically.
Post-1966 Evolution of Deposit-Rate Ceilings
Once the ceilings were in place, their justification broadened.In repeated
battles over proposed legislation, a coalition of the thrift, labor,and construction
lobbies has been able to defeat subsequent attempts to removethe ceilings. Since
1966, the large and cyclically fluctuating spreadbetween open-market yields and
passbook rates has accentuated cyclicaldisintermediation and reduced the flow of
savings to these institutions during most of the cycle.To minimize the disruption,
authorities have undertaken a series of additional actions. Regulatoryofficials13
adopted a strategy of restructuring deposit-interest ceilings in ways that promised
to lessen the disintermediation without greatly increasing costs on interest-
Lnse!itive funds. Repeated restructurings have developed a series of deposit
instruments that -bymaking the maximum interest payable on any type of deposit
account vary directly with its maturity and/or minimum denomination -allow
depository institutions to offer higher interest rates to interest—sensitive customers
without extending higher payouts to interest-insensitive ones. Although large CDs
are now completely exempt from regulation, between 1966 and early 1970, even
large CDs (though treated preferentially) were subject to ceilings. After January
21, 1970, interest was unfettered for certificate—of—deposit accounts of less than
90-days maturity and at least $100,000 in minimum denomination.
To make its own securities less competitive with thrift deposits, the
Treasury held interest rates on U.S. Savings Bonds well below those on marketable
securities of similar maturity: at 4.25 percent until December 1969, when they
were raised to only five percent. The Treasury also acted in February 1970 to raise
the minimum denomination of Treasury Bills from $1,000 to $10,000. Knowledge-
able small savers had increasingly placed noneompetitive bids in $1,000 and $5,000
units, winning a larger and larger proportion of the total amounts awarded in the
Treasury's weekly Bill auction (Mullineaux, 1973).
Investments in Real Estate and Consumer Durables as Opportunities for Escape.
During the post-1966 era, for households of modest means the inflation-
adjusted after—tax rate of return has been negative on the few financial assets
their transactable wealth permits them to buy. Even in the twenty-percent tax
bracket, a 5.25 percent return on passbook savings yields only 4.20 percent after
taxes. In the thirty—percent bracket, the after-tax yield falls to 3.68 percent. It is14
hard to remember when the rate of inflation in product prices did not exceed these
low rates of return. This means that savings invested in these assets have less real
value with each passing year.
In the absence of government—enforced ceilings on deposit interest rates,
market forces would have pushed financial-institution deposit rates up at least
enough to promise low—bracket depositors a small anticipated net yield. With
deposit-rate ceilings in place and transactions costs keeping small savers out of
bond and stock markets, many households have found that real-estate assets offer
their transactable savings the best available protection against inflation—induced
erosions in purchasing power. Real estate ownership has been a traditional goal for
Americans and returns on real property have been taxed much more favorably than
returns on financial assets. Federal tax treatment of a property's capital income is
especially generous for owner—occupants. Real estate gained attractiveness under
comprehensive deposit-rate ceilings because well-developed mortgage markets
provided a convenient vehicle for small savers to leverage their modest saving
enough to cover the purchase price of a residence or rental property. Institutional
arrangements do not exist to let them borrow so easily to purchase stock shares or
fixed-interest securities.Households dealing with dealers and brokers must
maintain margin accounts and pay one or two points over the broker—dealer interest
rate for margin credit.
Ironically, restrictions on deposit interest have driven small savers
increasingly into debt. Lacking enough wealth to invest directly in diversified
round lots of marketable bonds and stocks and prevented by law from enjoying the
full fruits of indirect investments in securities markets made by means of deposit
accounts, they have turned to investing in real assets, supplementing their savings
as necessary via mortgages and instalment loan contracts. With interest expense15
tax-deductible, real after-tax rates on loans made to support tax-favored
investments seem unusually low.
Although this explanation is still not widely appreciated, small savers'
efforts to protect their transactable wealth from being eaten away by artificially
low deposit rates provide the motive force both for declines in recorded ratios of
deposit—institution inflows to personal income and for an ongoing speculative boom
in housing. In this way, deposit-rate ceilings have reinforced the secular inflation
in housing costs and, by discouraging the flow of middle-income households' savings
into strictly financial instruments, reduced the pool of savings available for new
business investment too. Even though deposit-rate ceilings were intended to
promote housing activity, authorities by no means meant to push it so assiduously
or at such a high cost in macroeconomic destabilization.
III. LIMITATIONS OF OUR DATA BASE
Although the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center surveyed
consumer finances throughout the 1960s, only the 1962 and 1970 survey question-
naires develop detailed information on household balance sheets.2 Fortunately, the
two years lie symmetrically four years before and four years after what we can
call the twin economic—policy "crimes of '66." As we did with interest-rate
spreads, we propose to interpret the twin economic—policy shocks of accelerating
inflation and the spread of deposit-interest ceilings to thrift institutions as an
experimental "treatment" and to view survey data collected in the two years as
representative samples of pre—treatment and post—treatment values of household
income and balance-sheet variables.
Table 3 lists the particular survey variables investigated in this study.
Unfortunately, assets are not valued on a consistent basis. Respondent family units
were requested to furnish face values for bonds but to estimate market values for16
stocks and investment real estate. They were asked to estimatethe "present
value" of owner-occupied real estate (which we call homes) if theyhad resided
there during the second calendar year preceding the year of the survey;otherwise
they were asked merely to supply the home's purchase price.No matter how
accurately they may be able to value their assets, secretive people orfamilies
whose members had reason to conceal assets from each other wouldhave an
incentive to underreport their holdings. Forgetfulness would cause underreporting,
too. On the other hand, a desire to impress interviewers might temptsome
respondents toward boastful overstatement.
Clearly, as compared to contemporaneous transactions values,estimates
gathered in this way should have some systematicbiases and should be more
accurate for some asset categories than for others. For example,information
needed to estimate the value of a household's stock portfoliois more readily
accessible than that needed to appraise real estate. When housing prices arerising
especially quickly, household estimates may tend to lagmarket values. As discount
instruments, the values of unmatured U.S. Savings Bonds or TreasuryBills would be
consistently overstated. Similarly, the generally upwardtrend of interest rates in
the 19605 leads us to suspect that the market value ofOther Bonds would on
average fall short of face value. Thereader should keep these difficulties in mind
in interpreting our results.
Even in our two focal years, values for most typesof what we call
"nontransactable" assets and most debts were not reported at all.A few variables
were reported in one year only. As Table 3 indicates,across the two years some
variables are defined differently or are available in differentdetail.
Whatever one does to correct for these conceptual difficulties,one should
also recognize that (precisely because high-income samplecells are small in17
absolute size) SCF samples deliberately over-represent high—income families and
that SCF data tapes required careful editing to adapt them to our use. A few
observations appear more than once on SCF data tapes. Occasional overflows
occur in capital income and in individual assets, while in the 1970 survey partially
incomplete reports pose some difficult problems.3 In particular, differences in the
accuracy and completeness of respondent reports across conventional income and
age classes change the representativeness of our samples relative to the population
of U.S. households. Omissions and overflows should occur predominantly for
households whose incomes and wealth are high, and result in an understatement of
assets held by these groups. This measurement bias partly offsets the sampling
bias Survey Research Center personnel created by oversampling high-income
households.
IV. CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN
DIFFERENT AGE AND WEALTH CLASSES.
In analyzing SCF data, we seek to identify how average asset-holding
patterns differ with household income, transactable wealth, and the age, sex and
race of the household head. Our principal focus is to determine the extent to
which households in different economic and demographic circumstances shifted
their transactable wealth among three classes of assets for which survey
measurements exist:
1. Equity in real estate: defined as the difference between the value of
investment real estate and owner—occupied housing (i.e., "homes") and the
dollar amount of household debt secured by these properties;
2. Regulated financial assets: deposits and U.S. Savings bonds;
3.Unregulated financial assets: stocks, marketable bonds, and mutual
funds.18
The purpose of the exercise is to investigate how the combined burdens of
inflation and interest-rate ceilings are distributed across the population of U.S.
households. We are concerned particularly with determining how these burdens are
distributed across different types of families and how they have affected the mix
of debt and equity assets in household portfolios.
Given the structure of income taxes, transactions costs and interest—rate
ceilings, a household's ability to take advantage of regulation-exempt and tax-
avoiding savings opportunities may be expected to increase with its income (the
"income hypothesis") and its transactable wealth (the "wealth hypothesis"), and to
be influenced by its place in the life cycle (the "age hypothesis") and possible
membership in minority groups (the "minority hypothesis"). By analyzing cross-
section data on earnings, assets, debt and demographic characteristics collected in
the 1962 and 1970 Surveys of Current Finances, the rest of this paper develops
evidence consistent with a more precise formulation of each of these hypotheses.
Looking backward from 1979, it should be clear that ex the big losers
from accelerating inflation have been family units possessing large amounts of
stock or "regulated assets" (deposits and U.S. Savings bonds) and those who did not
own any real-estate assets at all. While wealthy households tend to be heaviest in
stock, households that fit the rest of this profile turn out to be drawn dispropor-
tionately from the ranks of the old, the black, the female, the poor, and the young.
Particularly in competing for mortgage loans, these groups are traditionally
disadvantaged (Sowell, 1975).Moreover, with accelerating inflation, deposit—
interest ceilings heighten that disadvantage by driving up both the cost of housing
and the demand for mortgages by other groups, while reducing the disadvantaged
families' ability to accumulate the financial wherewithal to make an acceptable
downpay ment.19
Testing the Hypothesis:
Consolidated Balance Sheets for Households Classified •
Surveydata depicting the composition of household assets indicate that
between 1962 and 1970 the combination of accelerating inflation and deposit-rate
ceilings has markedly changed the age distribution of real-estate ownership. This
is shown in Table 4. Even as early as 1970, households whose heads were less than
55 years in age had sharply increased the proportion of their accumulated savings
held as equity in real estate, while older households had shifted their funds out of
both real estate equity4 and "regulated financial assets" (deposits and U.S. savings
bonds) into "unregulated financial assets" (stocks, marketable bonds, and mutual
funds). Moreover, within their holdings of regulated assets, older households moved
funds from other categories into certificates of deposit (CDs). In 1970, survey
households whose heads were 55 or older owned approximately 55 percent of
reported net transactable wealth, but 75 percent of total CDs, deposits, and stock-
market investments and 85 percent of marketable bonds. In 1962, this age group
owned approximately 40 percent of respondents' net transactable wealth, and
(except that they held only 15 percent of marketable bonds) allocated their funds
fairly evenly across individual asset categories.
Presumably, older households find the in-kind return on housing less valuable
as their children grow up and set up households of their own. However, they could
afford economically to undertake these reallocations because they are on average
large savers.Also at issue are the development of experience and efficient
patterns for accumulating and decumulating wealth to smooth consumption over
the life cycle. Our interpretation of these data implicitly attributes observed20
changes in portfolio distributions between 1962 and 1970 to differences in the
ability of households of different ages to protect themselves both against increases
in inflation and inflation risk and against unfavorable regulatory developments in
financial markets. We simply presume that 1962 portfolio patterns are determined
predominantly by life-cycle considerations. However, since the 1962 survey was
taken about a year into a cyclical recovery and the 1970 survey at the beginning of
an economic decline, cyclical influences probably affect the results, too. During
the months of the 1962 survey, unemployment was cyclically high but falling. In
1970, unemployment was low but rising. Although aggregate unemployment rates
were not greatly different, unemployment among males aged 20 to 24 averaged
11.2 percent in the 1962 survey months and only 7.7 percent during the 1970
interview period. The cyclically poorer labor-market outlook in 1962 may well
have made some young households temporarily hesitant to undertake the
responsibilities of homeownership.
However, young households' dramatic increase in the proportions of their
transactable wealth placed in regulated assets and real-estate equity seems far too
large to attribute to this small difference in age-class unemploymentrates. In
1962, only 6.2 percent of households whose heads were under age 25owned their
own residences, but by 1970, 20.3 percent of households in the counterpart age
class were homeowners. In 1970, the youngest age class quadrupled the portfolio
weight carried by its 1962 counterpart. (Even if we eliminate as anoutlier the
wealthiest household in the 1962 age—class sample, the 1970 portfolio weight for
home equity is still 2.5 times its 1962 value.) Because households in the youngest
age class had generally smaller familiesin 1970 than in 1962 (so that they
presumably found the continuing services of a given living space less productive),
they must have anticipated substantial future appreciation in housing pricesto21
justify this allocational pattern. It is possible that this inflation-spawnedincrease
in the propensity of young families to undertake leveraged homeownership reflects
as well a generational difference in both borrowers' and lenders' attitudes toward
risk-bearing. The young have to live with the consequences of accelerating
inflation over a longer economic horizon than anyone else.In the face of
contemporary inflation, Table 5 indicates that modern lendingofficers and would-
be young borrowers have proved less inhibited psychologically by conventional
attitudes about the alleged "prudence" of "staying out of debt." But, adopting
plausible assumptions about prospective yields on alternative assets, weshow in
section V that even these massive portfolio shifts were insufficient to bring the
prospective 1970 portfolio rate of return for this age class up to thelevel earned
by older households.
Table 5 indicates that, whatever assets are ultimately supported by
real—estate debt (Arcelus and Meltzer, 1973), most age classes (especially the
youngest) carry in 1970 a larger proportion of this debt in their portfolios.Even
more important, the observed reallocation of the housing stock among age groups
has shifted ownership on balance from families who traditionally carry low debt
ratios to younger households who show much higher ratios of mortgage debt to
home equity and transactable wealth. This explains how the aggregate proportion
of home equity to net transactable wealth can actually decline between the survey
dates.
To show that our results measure a true generational difference, we can
reclassify the data to emphasize that the cohorts of households belongingto each
age group differ substantially between survey dates.Table 6 resets the boundaries
of the 1962 age classes to let us compare portfolio weights for the same age
cohorts at each survey date. This table makes it clear that household headswho22
are less than 25 years old in 1970 were not even sampled in 1962. Otherwise, it
confirms the age-class and generational paterns of asset accumulation and decumu-
lation inferred from Table 4. Further analysis (not reproduced here) indicates that
allowing for the effects of housing-price appreciation on each age cohort's 1962
investment in housing does not change the qualitative pattern of age-class portfolio
reallocation.
Evidence on the Accuracy of the Estimated Value of Owner-Occupied Housing
In valuing household real-estate investments, the two main sources of
measurement error are: (1) reliance on self—assessment and (2) the neglect of price
appreciation on homes purchased in the year preceding the survey date. These
errors are worrisome because they threaten to prove reinforcing. Taken together,
they might cause a serious understatement of home equity.
Bias Due to Neglecting Depreciation on Recently Purchased Homes. Turning to the
second issue first, Table 7 develops information on the four percent of 1970 survey
respondents who had purchased their homes in 1969. The U.S. Commerce
Department estimates that the average sales price of houses soldin 1969
increased 4.9 percent, with the rate of price increase greater in the first half of
the year than in the second. In the first half of 1970, prices increased another 0.7
percent. Since the survey instrument did not ascertain precisely when in 1969
individual homes were acquired, our calculations assume that by the survey date
each of these homes had experienced six months' appreciation in 1969 (2.5 percent)
plus a further 0.7 percent in 1970. Except in the youngest age class, the effect of
accounting for this appreciation is negligible. Even for this class, when raw data
are employed, the portfolio weight for home equity rises only by 1.2 percentage
points.23
Assessment Bias. Respondents' self-assessments of the value of their homesmay
be inaccurate because homeowners who do not actively participate inhousing
markets have a poor idea of trends in house prices. In Table 8, wedevelop
evidence by which to investigate whether, given the inflationarysurge in house
prices during the 1960s, homeowners who had occupied the same residence for
various periods of time consistently undervalued their property in 1970.
To do this, we report data on housing values at eachsurvey date by the year
in which homeowners first occupied their homes. We extrapolate the values
estimated in 1962 forward to 1970, using cumulative rates of increase observed in
average housing prices. These projections are meant to be compared with roughly
parallel assessments quoted by respondents in 1970.
Unfortunately, the data do not permit precise comparisons. First, 1962 and
1970 SCF data tapes aggregate reported years of occupation into largely noncom-
formable intervals. Hence, the two data sets place different boundaries on the
date-of-occupation variable. Second, since, indices of average housing prices are
available only from 1963, the first observations on year-to—year changes inhousing
prices date from 1964. To fill in the gap for 1962 and 1963, we used movements in
the GNP Price Deflator to proxy the rate of housing-price inflation. Finally, since
data published on housing prices cover only new houses, we need to consider
whether on average homeowners upgrade older houses to incorporate most of the
comforts being built routinely into newer structures.5 What we call our "low
projections" track changes in the value of a hypothetical house whose attributes
are fixed. Our "high projections" track changes in the value of the specific types
of houses constructed and sold in each year.
Since the assessments made by respondents in 1970average near the high
projections of comparable 1962 estimates, our data suggest that (at least in the
aggregate) self-assessment is not a serious source of downward bias.24
Testing the Wealth Hypothesis: Consolidated Balance Sheets
for Households Ranked y Their Net Transactable Wealth
For both survey dates, Table 9 reports consolidated portfolio weights for
households grouped by their decile of net transactable wealth. The observed
changes in portfolio patterns by wealth class confirm earlier analyses (Kane, 1970
and 1977) of post-1966 disintermediation. Sophisticated households with sizeable
amounts of savings can and do shop among a variety of assets. By 1970, they could
rearrange their financial—asset portfolios to lessen the burden that deposit—interest
ceilings would otherwise have placed on them. Moreover, the longer the ceilings
remained in force, the more fully financial markets and institutions could adapt to
help them. The rapid growth of money—market mutual funds and credit unions -
andthe development of small-denomination bonds by large municipal and corporate
issuers -provideexamples of this adaptation. Relaxing the ceilings on minimum—
denomination and longer-maturity certificates of deposits allows the nation's
wealthier households to earn higher explicit deposit rates at banks and thrift
institutions than ordinary families can. For small savers, possibilities for adapting
their financial portfolios are severely limited and have been further compressed by
government action to reduce disintermediation, notably the 1970 increase in the
minimum denomination of U.S. Treasury Bills. Providing they can obtain debt
financing, small savers lessen the burden of low ceiling rates of interest on
regulated financial assets principally by investing directly in homes,investment
real estate, and consumer durables.
Hence, in Table 9, between 1962 and 1970 we see that through thesixth
decile portfolio weights for regulated financial assets fall while the weights for
real—estate equity rise. Although households in the seventh decile of wealth show
much the same portfolio weights at both dates, between 1962 and 1970 savers in25
the eighth and ninth deciles undertook some marked shifts in the allocation of their
transactable wealth. Looking simultaneously at Table 10 which develops more
detailed data on financial assets, we see that these households moved funds
proportionately out of investment real estate, common stocks, checking accounts
and savings bonds into high-rate CDs and (to a lesser extent) into other savings
accounts.
Families in the highest—wealth decile (whose actions loom very large in
aggregate figures), reduced their home equity and moved out of every type of
regulated asset except CDs. Unlike middle—wealth households who decreased the
portfolio weight for common stock or low-wealth households who increased it, the
highest-wealth households held steady. They increased their portfolio weights for
only three asset categories: CDs, marketable bonds, and investment real estate.
For each survey date, Table 11 reports real-estate debt ratios by wealth
decile. For all deciles but the third, ratios of real-estate debt to various asset
values decline between 1962 and 1970. However, debt-to-income ratios behave
quite differently for households in different places in the wealth distribution. For
small savers, the ratio increases sharply between survey dates. For households in
the sixth through ninth wealth deciles, the ratio falls. The pattern of debt-to-
income ratios observed supports the hypothesis that in 1970 low-wealth households
found it necessary to leverage more of their human capital to support expansion in
real-estate equity and other assets.
V. ESTIMATED 1970 WEIGHTED-AVERAGE PROSPECTIVE
RATES OF RETURN FOR EACH AGE AND WEALTH CLASS
Our explanation of the changing distribution of household savings across
assets presumes that households reallocate their funds as far as possible to escape
the costs that accelerating inflation and deposit-rate regulation would otherwise26
impose upon them. To clarify how this process affects ex—ante portfolio returns,
Table 12 uses proxies for prospective 1970 asset yields to translate the portfolio
proportions underlying Tables 4 and 9 into weighted-average prospective rates of
return for each age and wealth class.Because these calculations neglect
discriminatory variation across wealth classes in the rates of return earned on
deposits, they provide conservative estimates of the degree to which returns on
financial assets differ with a household's transactable wealth and position in the
life cycle. On the other hand, reporting bond values on a face—value basis
systematically overw eights yields on the bond portion of household portfolios.
Since bond holdings tend to rise with wealth and age, at least the two biases are
offsetting in direction.
Specifically, the calculations reported in Table 12 employ the following
estimates of the annual average yield that might have been anticipated on
individual assets in 1970:
1. Yield on Demand Deposits =6.36percent (Stevens, 1976)6
2. Yield on Savings Deposits =5.06percent (Table 1).
3. Yield on U.S. Savings Bonds: 5.00 percent (Yield set on new U.S.
savings bonds in December, 1969).
4. Yield on Other Bonds: 6.58 percent (Table 1, Long-Term Treasury
Bond Yields)
5. Yield on Stocks and Mutual Funds: 8.5 percent [Mean Annual
Return on Common Stocks, 1926-1974 (Ibbotson and Sinquefeld,
1976)].
6. Yield on Equity in Home: 8.45percent (Table 1, FHLBB Mortgage
Interest-Rate Series)..27
7. Yield on Equity in Investment Real Estate:9.86 percent
(Average Interest Rates on Income Property Mortgages, American
Life Insurance Association, cited in Gettel (1976, p. 108)].
Our proxies for the last four yields are chosen conservatively, especially on
a before-tax basis. Yields on shorter instruments, taxable-equivalent yields on
municipals, and yields on corporate bonds averaged much higher than yields on
long-term U.S. governments. Moreover, although the ex 2 yield on stocks was
only 4.01 percent in 1970, prospective yields on common stocks almost certainly
exceeded the rate of inflation.For two—year and three-year holding periods,
realized per—annum yields on common-stock investments made in 1970 averaged 9.0
and 12.2 percent respectively. Over 1901—1971, Friend and Blume (1975) estimate
mean per-annum yields on stocks of 9.0 percent.
Most importantly, while yields on both forms of real—estate equity should
equal corresponding mortgage interest rates at the margin, prospective returns
figure to be higher on average. Our estimates of prospective real—estate yields
may be excessively conservative. Although a telephone survey of trade associ-
ations in St. Louis, Chicago, and Washington could uncover no direct data on real-
estate returns, information in the files of the General Services Administration's
Appraisal Staff supports using an ex-ante per-annum return of just over 12.00
percent in 1970. Diamond (1979) estimates (net of anticipated price appreciation)
a before-tax "user cost of capital" of 12.49 percent for owner-occupied housing in
1970. liendershott and Hu (1979) report estimates of this cost in 1964, 1972, and
1978, for households in three different tax brackets and under two alternative
models for forming expectations of future price appreciation. Hendershott and
Hu's estimates range between 12 and 13 percent for households in their lowest tax
bracket.28
Alternatively, a 10—percent basic rate of prospective return on housing in
1970 can be constructed as the sum of an imputed rental rate of return and an
anticipated rate of housing-price appreciation. Drawing on the national-income
accounts, Larry Kotlikoff of the National Bureau of Economic Research estimates
(in private correspondence) that the imputed rental rate exceeded 4 percent in
every year between 1962 and 1970.Over the three years preceding 1970,
Commerce Department indices of housing prices increased roughly 6 percent.
Factoring in the benefits of leverage easily supports a rate of return on equity of
12 percent or more.
Table 13 develops alternative, less-conservative estimates of portfolio rates
of return for households in our ten wealth and six age classes. These estimates
assume higher anticipated returns on other bonds (8 percent) and on both forms of
real—estate equity (12 percent).
Under either set of assumptions, prospective 1970 yields on regulated
financial assets average less than 6.00 percent. Even without formal calculations,
it is obvious that overall rates of return will be highest for classes with low
percentages of their transactable wealth in these assets and high percentages in
unregulated assets and real-estate equity. Because deposit-rate regulation artifi-
cially restricts the explicit rewards offered on low—risk assets, households have
been encouraged to occupy riskier and less-than—perfectly-diversified balance-
sheet positions.
Tables 12 and 13 develop two remarkable results. First, while households in
the lowest deciles have simply been short-changed, households in the middle wealth
deciles used investments in real estate to offset a good portion of the discrim-
inatory effect of deposit—rate ceilings on the yields they could earn on strictly
financial assets. Although differences in marginal tax rates importantly affect the
desirable breakdown between prospective in-kind running yield and price29
appreciation, combined portfolio yields differ much less by wealth than financial
yields do. Second, along with the very poor, young households (those whose head is
under 25 years of age) emerge as the group most severely burdened by the double—
whammy of accelerating inflation and interest-rate ceilings. This may occur
because these households realize a lower in-kind running yield from a given living
space or because they have a hard time competing for mortgage funds, especially
when state usury ceilings are binding on mortgage interest rates. Whatever the
reason, unlike other age classes in 1970, young families were able to use real-
estate investments to eliminate only about half of the gap between the yield on
their portfolio and that earned by members of the modal class.
Even the conservative estimates in Table 12 indicate that on a before-tax
basis households in the middle and upper wealth classes were able in 1970—by
taking on additional portfolio risk—to anticipate earning a positive real rate of
return even on their financial assets. Whether after-tax real yields are positive as
well depends on the breakdown of these returns between explicit running yields,
implicit yields, and price appreciation. However, households in the various wealth
classes reached out for this yield along different effective risk-return loci and took
on quite—distinct risks. Unanticipated developments over the decade of the 1970s
(particularly, unanticipated inflation) made shifts into real-estate equity look even
wiser ex post and movements into unregulated assets look fatuous.
VI. TESTING THE MINORITY HYPOTHESIS:
CONSOLIDATED 1970 BALANCE SHEETS AND PROSPECTIVE PORTFOLiO
YIELDS FOR FAMILIES IN DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC CIRCUMSTANCES
Accelerating inflation and deposit-rate ceilings tax the poor to finance
"welfare" for the rest of us. In their distributional effect,they are equivalent to a
confiscatory federal tax that fails on the financial wealth of small savers only and30
whose proceeds are designated to subsidize homebuilders, homeowners, and
managers and/or stockholders of inefficient depository institutions.7
Besides stock—market investors, after—the—fact losers in the ame of accel-
erating inflation cum deposit regulation have been families of modest means who
concentrate their savings in regulated assets and/or do not ownany real-estate at
all. Compared to other respondents, these families are drawn disproportionately
from the ranks of the black, the female, the poor, and theyoung. In competing for
mortgages, these groups are traditionally portrayed as disadvantaged. However,
deposit—interest ceilings aggravate that disadvantage by driving up both the cost of
housing and demands for mortgages among other groups, while reducing the
disadvantaged sectors' ability to accumulate an acceptable downpayment.
For four different demographic groups, Table 14 shows how household asset
allocations and anticipated portfolio returns varied with net transactable wealth in
1970.8 Less than ten percent of the lowest—wealth householdswere able to
participate in real-estate ownership. They placed the bulk of their wealth in
regulated assets (deposits and U.S. savings bonds). Within each group, wealthier
households proved increasingly able to use both real-estate and securities invest-
ments to secure an anticipated positive net real rate of return on their overall
portfolios. Interestingly, controlling for wealth and sex of head, black households
show a higher propensity for real—estate investment than white families.
Distinguishing between real-property owners and nonowners in the same four
demographic groups, Table 15 shows how 1970 portfolio weights and anticipated
yields varied by age class. In each demographic group, the proportion of young
families that own real property is low. However, because of differences in the
distribution of wealth, it is almost uniformly lower for female—headed families than
for male-headed families and for black families than for white ones. Controlling
for the age and sex of household heads, black families show a lesser participation in
real-estate ownership than white families. This occurs despite black families'31
greater propensity for real-estate ownership as shown in Table 14, because they
families have disproportionately less wealth and income than white households.
For the same groups that are featured in Table 15, Table 16 presents 1970
portfolio weights and anticipated yields by household income. Households with less
than $7500 in 1970 income are about evenly divided between real-property owners
and nonowners, but within this category black and female—headed families prove
less likely to own real estate.
VU. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Evidence developed in this paper clarifies how in the face of comprehensive
deposit—rate ceilings real estate has served as the ordinary citizen's chief hope
against accelerating inflation. By expanding their proportionate holdings of real
estate, households with below—average wealth were able in the late 1960s to
anticipate positive real after—tax rates of portfolio return despite painful interest-
rate ceilings on the deposits and savings bonds in which their transactable wealth
had traditionally been concentrated. By discriminatorily reducing the efficiency of
financial intermediation, interest—rate ceilings have biased investments by small
savers toward tangible assets (especially real estate) and investments by very large
savers toward unregulated financial assets.
Although these reconstituted portfolios made sense in 1970, they appear
unnecessarily risky ex ante for both groups.With real-estate investments
protected against unanticipated inflation and stocks and bonds proving surprisingly
vulnerable to it, so far the nation's wealthiest households have fared less well ex
post than the average homeowner. However, precisely because homeowners'
portfolios of transactable wealth are protected against unanticipated inflation,
they remain exposed to substantial deflation risk. As they come to realize this,
homeowners may begin to function politically as an explicit constituency for
inflation.32
Other remarkable findings concern the increased emphasis on leveraged
housing investment among the very young. Between 1962 and 1970, households
headed by persons under 25 years of age greatly expanded equity in homes,
although not enough to lift estimated yields on their savings up to the level
achieved by older groups. Since the implicit yield on a given home tends to
increase with family size, along with older households contemporaryyoung families
may be disadvantaged in the running yields that they can earn on equity invested in
homes. In addition, binding ceilings on mortgage interest rates tend to restrict
young persons' ability to finance desired purchases of homes.
Our data also show that, between 1962 and 1970, direct holdings of
marketable bonds and stock have become more tightly concentrated in the hands of
wealthy investors. This development supports the hypothesis that at least in 1970
only wealthy households could economically engage in strictly financial-market
disintermediation. This explains why federal banking and S&L regulators settled on
the strategy of relaxing deposit-rate ceilings only on minimum-denomination and
longer-maturity accounts. This approach conserves depository-institution profits
by allowing them to increase the yields offered to interest-sensitive customers
without simultaneously raising yields on interest-insensitive funds.However,
regulators must recognize that, even among small savers, interest sensitivity tends
to increase with the length of time that sizeable interest-rate differentials remain
in force.
Finally, our analysis provides a more balanced perspective on the supposedly
unfavorable trends of falling funds flows to traditional savings institutions and
rising ratios of household debt to income. These developments reflect not
profligacy but households' willingness to expose themselves to deflation risk in
hopes of enhancing the real value of their accumulated savings. Aggregate33
household saving is alive and well, but it is taking some unconventional and risky
forms. More and more, prudent households are focusing on building up a
speculative investment portfolio of inflation-protected tangible assets to










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Effective Federal Tax Rates on Equivalent Real Taxable Incomes
for Households Filing Joint Returns in 1962 and 1970
1962 1970
Equivalent Marginal Marginal
Taxable Taxable Tax Rate TaxRate 1962 1970
Income Income in on 1962 (Includes Average Average
in 1970 1962 Equivalent 2.5% Tax rIax
Dollars Dollars Income Surtax) Rate Rate
1,000 772 .20 .15 .20 .14
5,000 3,862 .20 .195 .20 .17
10,000 7,724 .22 .226 .21 .19
20,000 15,448 .30 .328 .24 .22
30,000 23,173 .38 .400 .28 .27
50,000 38,621 .53 .513 .36 .35
100,000 77,243 .69 .636 .49 .46
500,000 386,214 .90 .718 .78 .66
Source:Equivalent 1962 real incomes are calculated using the ImplicitPrice Deflator.
Joint-Return tax schedules are taken from Federal Tax Handbook, 1963, Engle-
wood Cliffs: Prentice—Hall, 1962 and 1971 U.S. Master Tax Guide, Chicago:
Commerce Clearinghouse, 1970.36
Table 3. List of Variables Generated from the 1962
and 1970 Surveys of Consumer Finances for Use in This Study
VariableAvailableAvailable
Variable Name Symbol in 1962? in 1970?
A. Financial Assets FA Calculated Calculated
1. Regulated Assets RA Calculated Calculated
a. Checking Accounts Yes Yes
b. Savings Accounts Yes Calculated
1. Certificates of Deposit No Yes
ii. Other Savings Accounts No Yes
c. U. S. Savings Bonds (Face Value) Yes Yes
2. Unregulated Assets UA Calculated Calculated
a. Stocks and Mutual Funds (Market Value) Yes Yes
b. Bonds other than U. S. Savings Bonds
(Face Value) Calculated Yes
i. U. S. Government Bonds Yes No
ii. Municipal Bonds Yes No
iii. Corporate Bonds Yes No
B. Real-Estate Assets REACalculated Calculated
1. Home, Farm, or Mobile Home
a. Equity HE Yes Yes
b. Market Value HV Yes Yes
2. Investment Real Estate (Including LandContracts)
a. Equity IRE Yes Yes
b. Estimated Market Value IRV Yes Yes
C. Real-Estate Debt REDCalculated Calculated
1. Value of Mortgages on Home, Farm, or
Mobile Home Yes Yes
2. Value of Mortgages on Investment Real Estate Yes Yes
D. Explicit Income in the Previous Calendar Year
1. Total Household Income Y Yes Yes
2. Capital Income (Dividends, Interest, Trust
Funds, Royalties, and Rent) YC
a. Of Whole Household YCWH Yes No
b. Of Head Only \CH No Yes


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8. Constructing Housing-Value
Projections That Cast Light on Aggregate Assessment Bias
Aggregate Number of Average
Year Est. Value of Households Estimated High Low
in Which Homes OccupiedMoving in Value of Projection Projection
Homeowner in DesignatedDuring the Designated of Value of Value
Moved Into Years Designated Homes in 1970 in 1970
Current home (in $Thousand) Years (in $thou.) (in $thou.) (in $thou.)
1962 Data Set
1939 or earlier 2,386 163 14.64 21.96 19.47
1940—1949 3,120 229 13.62 20.43 18.11
1949 or earlier* 5,506 392 14.05 21.08 18.69
1950—1954 3,575 258 13.86 20.78 18.43
1955—1960 6,972 455 15.32 22.98 20.38
1960or earlier* 16,053 1,105 14.53 21.80 19.32
1961 1,153 79 14.59 21.89 19.40
1962 64 4 16.00 24.00 21.28
1970 Data Set
1945 or earlier 4,474 229 19.54
1946—1955 6,666 333 20.02
1956—1960 5,474 238 23.00
1960 or earlier* 16,614 800 20.77
1961—1965 8,283 373 22.21
Source:Same as Table 4
Notes: Projections for 1970 employ a cumulative growth factor generated by
multiplying year-to—year changes in two "extended" indices of housing prices (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1977). The "high projection" combines the rate of
increase in the GNP price deflator for 1962 and 1963 with the Commerce
Department's series of changes in the average sales price of new houses
actually sold in each of the years 1964 through mid-1970.The estimated
cumulative inflation factor is 50 percent. The "low projection" replaces year-to-
year changes in the prices of houses sold in each year with changes in the average
sales price of the kinds of houses sold in 1974. This produces a cumulative
inflation factor of only 33 percent.
The symbol *indicatesobservations constructed by summing aggregate

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12. Estimates of Prospective 1970 Portfolio Rate of Return
for Each Age Class and Wealth Dedile
(Stated in Percent Per Annum)
Decile Ranking Yield on Combined Yield on
of Households' Financial Financial Assets
















Under 25 5.81 7.18
25 to 34 6.20 8.09
35 to 44 6.86 8.32
45 to 54 6.46 8.19
55 to 64 7.10 8.11
65 and over 6.88 8.00
All Respondents 6.85 8.12
Source: Calculated from portfolio weights underlying Tables 4 and 9, using yield
assumptions stated in the text.46
Table 13. Less-Conservative Estimates of Prospective 1970 Portfolio
Rate of Return for Each Age Class and Wealth Decile
(Stated in Percent Per Annum)
Dedile Ranking Yield on Combined Yield on
of Households' Financial Financial Assets
















Under 25 5.82 8.69
25 to 34 6.23 10.38
35 to 44 6.88 10.51
45 to 54 6.51 10.56
55 to 64 7.20 9.87
65 and over 6.97 9.63
All Respondents 6.93 10.07
Source: Calculated from portfolio weights underlying Tables 4 and 9, using yield
assumptions stated in the text.
Note: As compared to the estimates reported in Table 12, these calculations
assume higher anticipated rates of return on other bonds (8 percent), home-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































*The author, who is Everett D. Reese Professor of Banking and Monetary
Economics at The Ohio State University, wishes to thank Alexander J. Shumay for
skillful and painstaking research assistance and the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research for furnishing Survey of Consumer Finances data.
Data-processing took place mainly via IBM 370 programs written by Mr. Shumay.
This paper extends and substantially refocuses an earlier study (Kane, 1980). For
detailed criticism of earlier drafts, the author is grateful to Philip Cagan, Dennis
Draper, Benjamin Friedman, John McConnell, Joseph Minarik, John Tuccillo, and
George von Furstenberg and to seminar audiences at The Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, The Georgia Institute of Technology, Michigan State University, The
National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge), The University of Washington,
Western Michigan University, and The University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Finally, the research reported here is part of the NBER's research on The
Changing Roles of Debt and Equity in Financing U.S. Capital Formation. The
author wishes to thank the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
and The Ohio State University Center for Real Estate Education and Research for
financial support. AU opinions expressed are those of the author and not
those of the NBER or any sponsoring agency.
'Between 1962 and 1970, net acquisition of claims on pension funds averaged a
fairly steady 22 percent of household asset acquisitions. Year by year, this
proportion varied only between 20 and 24 percent. Net acquisitions of consumer
durables averaged about 29 percent of household acquisitions, and the proportion
ranged year by year between 21 and 36 percent.
2Katona et al. (1963 and 1971) reproduce copies of the survey instruments. As
explained by Hansmire (1976) the SCF was discontinued after 1970. Her essay
includes a summary statement of just what variables were measured in each year.
Under the sponsorship of the three federal banking agencies, the Survey Research
Center conducted a partly similar Consumer Credit Survey in 1977. In future
research, I plan to compare changes in household balance sheets across the three
survey dates.
3Because incomplete records often show substantial values for one or more specific
categories of assets, in compiling portfolio distributions, we chose to treat missing
values as true zeroes.
is interesting to note that in 1978 federal tax law was changed to increase the
special tax forgiveness for capital gains on sales of personal residences by older
taxpayers from $35,000 to $100,000 and the minimum age for qualifying for this
benefit was lowered from 65 to 55. To secure this change, older households
(especially those in the 55-to-64 age class) must have complained bitterly about the
government's growing tax take on these transactions.54
5To communicate thetypes of quality improvements that are occurring, Herter
(1979) reports that between 1970 and 1977 new one—family houses increased in size
and amenities. The median square footage increased from 1510square feet to 1720
square feet, while the percentage of homes that included each of the following
features increased as follows: a dishwasher (from 42percent to 82 percent); two or
more bathrooms (from 48 to 70 percent); one or more fireplaces (from 35 to 61
percent); and a garage (from 58 to 68 percent).
60f the four financialyields we estimate, this is the only one that features an
implicit component. We treat this series asymmetrically because implicit returns
dominate competition for demand deposits.
71n the case of mutualinstitutions, availability of these subsidies may have
intensified managerial incentives for converting to a stock charter.
8Our analysis of minority portfoliosignores a relatively small number of disparate
nonwhite respondents who are nonbiack.55
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